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The Promises of New York Times v. 
Sullivan 
David A. Anderson* 
By any measure, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 was a 
monumental decision. It altered American politics, journalism, 
and public life, for better and worse.  It freed the press from the 
handcuffs of archaic libel doctrines, and it removed the constraints 
of provable truth.  It stripped away some of the legal underbrush 
that public officials relied on to conceal their misdeeds, and it 
liberated attack dogs in political campaigns.  It subjected 
celebrities to levels of scrutiny that press agents could not 
prevent, and it abetted the creation of celebrity culture. 
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court downplayed the case’s 
significance.  Indeed, Brennan went out of his way to make the 
changes wrought by the decision seem incremental.2  But many 
saw in the decision potentially revolutionary ideas about freedom 
 
* Fred and Emily Wulff Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law 
School.  I thank Kathleen Pritchard and Caitlyn Hubbard for their research 
assistance. 
 1.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 2.  For example, by analogizing the new “actual malice” rule to “a like 
rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts, “  id. at 280, and by 
claiming that the new rule “is appropriately analogous to the protection 
accorded a public official when he is sued for libel by a private citizen,” id. at 
282.  The alleged “like rule” was a far less protective common law rule 
accepted in a minority of states, and “the protection accorded a public official” 
was absolute while the actual malice rule was not.  
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of speech and press, the relation of speech and reputation, the 
direction of First Amendment theory, the Supreme Court’s 
priorities, and the needs of a self-governing people.  My aim in 
this Article is to identify some of those expectations and evaluate 
their success.  Expectations related to reform of libel law, 
expansion of First Amendment theory, shifting the focus of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, and protecting information as well as 
ideas are evaluated in Sections I-IV, respectively. 
I. REFORMING THE LAW OF LIBEL 
The expressed goal of New York Times was to liberate debate 
on public issues from the chill of libel.3  The perceived problem 
with the common law regime it replaced was that it dampened the 
vigor and limited the variety of public debate, because critics of 
official conduct were “deterred from voicing their criticism, even 
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, 
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so.”4  The antidote was: 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with “actual malice”―that is, with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not.5 
Even though the Court stopped short of removing the chill of 
libel altogether, that goal has been largely achieved.  Justice 
Black complained in his concurrence that the actual malice test 
“provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically 
to discuss public affairs.”6  During the Court’s deliberations, 
however, Black had sent Brennan a respectful note stating that, 
however the case came out, “it is bound to be a very long step 
towards preserving the right to communicate ideas.”7  This private 
note turned out to be a more accurate prediction than Black’s 
 
 3.  See id. at 270. 
 4.  Id. at 279. 
 5.  Id. at 279–80. 
 6.  Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring). 
 7.  KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: 
CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 170 (2011). 
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public criticism of the majority. 
  Judging by the number of scurrilous charges, half-truths, 
and unprovable accusations that surface in political campaigns, it 
is hard to believe that the vigor and variety of public debate is still 
being dampened, at least in politics.  The media still complain 
about libel law, mostly because they still have to defend against 
occasional suits, but successful libel suits by public officials have 
all but vanished.  Although the New York Times decision talked 
about freeing debate on public issues, it actually only addressed 
debate about public officials, and then only those statements 
relating to their official conduct.8  The logic of the decision, 
however, soon led the Court to extend its protection to statements 
about the character of public officials,9 the fitness of candidates 
for public office,10 and the character and conduct of private 
persons who seek to influence public events.11  The logic did not 
extend to people who seek no such influence and are famous only 
because they are successful in their fields, but the Court soon 
extended the New York Times rule to them too12  – exposing 
celebrities, athletes, and artists to the same scrutiny as public 
officials. 
Alleviating the chill of libel law was not accomplished solely, 
or even primarily, by the actual malice rule.  The rule merely 
added another element to the libel plaintiff’s burden and by itself 
would have had limited effect.  The decision’s transformative 
effect on the law of libel resulted mainly from  the ancillary rules 
that the Court established, some in the New York Times opinion 
and some later.  One of the former was the requirement that 
plaintiffs prove actual malice clearly and convincingly.13  This 
enhanced evidentiary standard made it easier for judges to 
overrule juries, as the Court did in New York Times itself,14 but it 
did not necessarily give judges carte blanche to evaluate the 
evidence for themselves.  That power came with the next step: 
abandonment of the usual deference to jury findings on questions 
 
 8.  N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 9.  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968). 
 10.  Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971).  
 11.  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
 14.  Id. at 285. 
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of fact.  The Court claimed that “considerations of effective judicial 
administration” required it to review the evidence itself to 
determine whether it could constitutionally support the 
judgment.15  This appeared to be nothing more than a discreet 
way of saying that the Court did not trust the Alabama courts to 
faithfully apply the new rule.  Few people recognized it for what it 
became: a repudiation of the centuries-old belief that juries, not 
judges, were the best safeguard against abuses in libel law.16  The 
assertion of power to review the evidence soon evolved into full-
blown “independent review” by judges.17 
Making judges the final arbiters of libel, at least in actual 
malice cases, is the main reason for the success of New York Times 
and its progeny.  As long as juries had the final say on matters of 
fact, unpopular defendants could take little comfort from the 
actual malice rule, even as reinforced by the clear and convincing 
proof standard.  Independent review changed all that.  It meant 
that the defendant could overcome an adverse jury verdict if the 
trial judge, exercising his or her own judgment unencumbered by 
deference to the jury, disagreed.  If the trial judge agreed with the 
jury, the defendant could still win if an appellate court disagreed 
with the jury.  And independent review rewarded only defendants.  
It was not available to plaintiffs because its purpose was to ensure 
that the judgment did not offend the Constitution, and an 
erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor posed no constitutional 
threat. 
The Court’s commitment to the reform of libel law did not end 
with New York Times.  In the twenty-five years following New 
York Times, the Court decided twenty-seven additional libel cases, 
most of them expanding the constitutional protection.18  It held 
 
 15.  Id. at 284–85. 
 16.  The belief that juries were the best safeguard goes back at least to 
the case of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 675, 721–22 (1735).  The 
fullest report of the case and its legacy is JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF 
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (Stanley Nider 
Katz, ed., 1963); see also VINCENT BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER 
(1957). 
 17.  See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 
passim (1984). 
 18.  The cases are cited in David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth 
Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 n.2 (1991). 
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that actual malice is not shown by proving ill will19 or failure to 
investigate.20  Hyperbolic statements21 or statements that were 
false but created an impression no more harmful than the truth 
would have created,22 could not meet the test.  The Court 
extended New York Times to low-level appointed officials23 and 
private citizens who assumed prominent positions on public 
matters.24  It also extended its influence to other torts, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress25 and invasion of 
privacy.26 
Together with these later decisions, New York Times was 
remarkably successful in reducing the threat of libel judgments.  
It was markedly less successful, however, in reducing the chill 
that results from fear of having to defend a libel case.  The actual 
malice test is a cumbersome and expensive way of avoiding 
liability.  It does little to prevent burdensome litigation; plaintiffs 
who have little chance of succeeding continue to sue, and because 
actual malice is a state-of-mind test, it invites extensive inquiry 
into the defendant’s knowledge, leading to intrusive and costly 
discovery efforts.27 
Relieving defendants of these burdens has been accomplished 
largely by non-constitutional changes that make it easier for 
defendants to win without going to trial.  The Supreme Court held 
that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs are 
required to meet the clear and convincing proof standard to 
survive a motion for summary judgment,28 and many states have 
 
 19.  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1964). 
 20.  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968). 
 21.  Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970). 
 22.  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). 
 23.  See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (holding that “the 
‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to 
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs,” and could apply to the supervisor of a county 
recreation area); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam) (Collins 
was a local police chief, see Henry v. Collins, 158 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. 1963)).   
 24.  Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), 
rev’d sub nom. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967) (Walker 
was a retired general who inserted himself in a racial protest). 
 25.  Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 26.  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967). 
 27.  See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979). 
 28.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). 
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held the same as a matter of state law.29  In a few states, this 
preference for summary judgment is bolstered by statutes that 
give defendants a right to interlocutory appeal if their summary 
judgment motions are denied.30  These statutes go a long way 
towards deterring suits, because they require plaintiffs’ cases to 
survive one or more appeals before they even get to a jury. 
Many states have statutes that require some plaintiffs to 
make a preliminary showing of likelihood of success before they 
can pursue their claims.31  These statutes were originally aimed 
at “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (“SLAPP”) 
and were touted as a way to prevent targets of public controversy 
(such as polluting industries) from silencing citizen activists by 
filing libel suits that had little chance of producing damage 
awards, but would divert the critics’ resources and energies.32  
Anti-SLAPP statutes generally permit the defendant to file an 
early motion to strike the complaint.33  If the defendant can show 
that the suit arose out of speech that concerns a public issue, the 
complaint will be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate, 
through pleadings and affidavits, a probability of prevailing.34  
Media defendants quickly availed themselves of the procedure,35 
and in some states the preliminary proceeding has become the 
principal means by which libel cases are decided.36 
In the world of new media, all of these developments, 
 
 29.  See, e.g., George v. Fabri, 548 S.E.2d 868, 875 (S.C. 2001); Eubanks 
v. N. Cascades Broad., 61 P.3d 368, 374 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
 30.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a) (McKinney Supp. 2014); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (West Supp. 2011). 
 31.  For a comprehensive list of state statutes and case law, see State 
Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/ 
your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
 32.  See Jerome I. Braun, California’s Anti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven 
Years, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 731 n.4 (2003). 
 33.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014) (“A 
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in 
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 
States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be 
subject to a special motion to strike.” (emphasis added)). 
 34.  See, e.g., id. (“. . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim.”). See also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So. 2d 1037, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 35.  See, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 46, 50–52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 36.  See Braun, supra note 32, at 735. 
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including the New York Times decision itself, are far less 
important than Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”).37  That federal statute, passed in 1996, immunizes 
Google, Yahoo, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Tumblr, and 
innumerable other websites from liability, unless they originate 
the defamatory material themselves.38  In other words, almost 
everyone who would be worth suing for online defamation is 
untouchable.  One student of the new media says, “CDA 230 is 
[t]oday’s Sullivan.”39 
That is a bit of an overstatement.  It is true that non-
constitutional developments have done more than the New York 
Times decision to reduce the chill resulting from the expense and 
uncertainty of litigation.  But for the old media and most 
individual speakers, it is still the Times decision that provides the 
ultimate safeguard against large judgments.  More importantly, 
the Times decision precipitated the changes in attitudes that 
made courts and legislatures amenable to these non-constitutional 
changes.  Without saying so explicitly, New York Times 
proclaimed that free speech is more important than reputation in 
the American value system.40  Disquieting as that proposition was 
to many people, it eventually became the unspoken credo upon 
which judges and legislators acted. 
The best measure of New York Times’ success in protecting 
criticism of public officials is to be found in the headlines of any 
day’s newspaper, to say nothing of the blasts in the blogosphere: 
reports of the sexual peccadillos of military leaders, aspersions on 
the honesty of public officials, accusations of cronyism or graft, 
even charges of criminal conduct.  For better or worse, libel law no 
longer “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public 
debate.”41 
 
 37.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering 
in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2286 (2014). 
 40.  See Joan E. Schaffner, Note, Protection of Reputation Versus 
Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of 
Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 444 (1990) (“[B]y preserving free 
speech[,] . . . the Court allowed the law of defamation to lose most of its 
protection for reputation.”). 
 41.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
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II. EXPANDING FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
Initially, New York Times seemed to be a breakthrough in 
First Amendment theory.  The late Harry Kalven, an astute 
interpreter of the First Amendment, believed the Court had 
produced “an opinion that may prove to be the best and most 
important it has ever produced in the realm of freedom of 
speech.”42  If free speech was more important than reputation in 
the American value system, then free speech probably was more 
important than most other values as well. 
Until New York Times, speech had been treated the way most 
countries treat it today: as an important value to be balanced 
against other values.43  The clear and present danger test44 was 
intended to skew that balance in favor of speech, but the 
assumption was still clear: other interests could still trump free 
speech.  In Justice Brandeis’s most famous defense of free speech, 
he said the exercise of free speech “is subject to restriction, if the 
particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the 
State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic, 
or moral.”45  As late as 1951, the Court embraced Learned Hand’s 
view:  “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 
‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”46 
The promise of New York Times was that speech was a value 
of a different order – if not a preeminent value, at least one 
fundamental to a political system based on sovereignty of the 
people.  Of course the Court had previously identified it as a 
“fundamental right,” but that was for purposes of deeming it 
 
 42.  Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 194 (1964). 
 43.  See European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 
C.E.T.S no. 194. 
 44.   See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 45.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). The kinds of injuries mentioned in this list 
could justify restricting speech for just about any reason the government 
might give. 
 46.  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th amendment.47  
That usage said nothing about its relation to other rights; after 
all, the rights to use contraceptives48 and refuse medical 
treatment49 are also considered fundamental for 14th Amendment 
purposes, and no one thinks that makes them preeminent.  
Treating freedom of speech as fundamental to the political system 
made it not just a fundamental personal right, but a foundational 
right. 
The language that came to embody this new understanding 
was the assertion of “a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.”50  Those words have become the starting 
point for First Amendment analysis in a wide variety of cases; 
they have been quoted in sixty-three Supreme Court opinions on 
subjects ranging from postal censorship to campaign finance.51  
 
 47.  See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (stating that 
freedom of speech and press “are among the fundamental personal rights and 
liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by 
state action”). 
 48.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 49.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
 50.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 51.  See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. 
Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (public financing of elections); 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (funeral protests); Christian 
Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971, 3020 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (public university’s official 
recognition of a religious student group); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 471 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(campaign finance); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467 (2007) 
(political speech); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003) (campaign 
finance, political speech, and disclosures), overruled by Citizens United, 558 
U.S. 310; Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001) (broadcasting of 
intercepted speech); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 
U.S. 604, 629 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(campaign finance); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 
(1995) (distribution of anonymous leaflets); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 
661, 672 (1994) (discharge of government-employed nurse); Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (defamation); Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 92 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (political 
considerations in government employment); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 
401, 421 n.2 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(regulations governing receipt of subscription publications by federal prison 
inmates); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988) (abortion protesters 
picketing before or about residence); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) 
(signs critical of foreign governments on public sidewalks near embassies of 
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those governments); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) 
(discharge of public employee for political speech); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986) (libel); Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 
U.S. 953, 954 (1985) (mem) (Brennan, J., dissenting denial of certiorari) 
(libel); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 815 
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (exclusion of federal employees from 
participation in a charity drive); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985) (defamation); McDonald v. Smith, 472 
U.S. 479, 486 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (libel); Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (copyright infringement); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (campaign finance); FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984) (political speech); Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 314 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (demonstrators sleeping in park); Members of City Council of L.A. 
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (posting of signs on public 
property); Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 309 
(1984) (Stevens J., dissenting) (public employee speech); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 162 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (early filing deadline for independent 
candidates for office); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 
(1982) (civil rights boycott); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 
490, 566 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (commercial speech); Lorain 
Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966, 970 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
denial of certiorari) (libel); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (public access to 
criminal trial); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462–63 (1980) (picketing); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 
548 n.9 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (inserts in utility bills); McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(political candidacy and religious belief); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 
(1976) (discharge of public employees based on political affiliation); Young v. 
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976) (adult movie theater); Hynes 
v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part) (political canvassing and solicitation); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (campaign finance and political speech), 
superseded by statute as stated in McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; Rogers v. United 
States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (threat against the 
life of the President of the United States); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 
310–11 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)  (political candidate’s right to 
advertise); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974) 
(political candidate’s right to reply to newspaper); Old Dominion Branch No. 
496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974) (libel); 
Colum. Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112 (1973) 
(requirements of broadcasters regarding acceptance of editorial 
advertisements); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 738 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (right of reporters to refuse to testify regarding confidential 
sources); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (school 
picketing); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) 
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The phrase is said to have originated in a memo to Justice 
Brennan from one of his law clerks, Stephen Barnett.52  Its 
rhetorical power is majestic, but it was more aspirational than 
descriptive.  Our history was not one of commitment to 
uninhibited debate on public issues.  The Court had previously 
held that the law need not tolerate advocacy of resistance to the 
draft,53 opposition to war,54 urging overthrow of the 
government,55 advocating revolution,56 or endorsing 
Communism.57 
There was certainly no national commitment to the view that 
defamatory speech should be uninhibited.  The commitment was 
to the proposition that debate on public issues should be inhibited 
for the purpose of protecting reputation.  The Framers of the First 
Amendment gave assurances that they were leaving the states 
free to punish libel.58  Until 1964, “[c]reators of legal doctrine 
insisted that despite guarantees for freedom of political 
expression, the good names of the ‘best men’ could not be left 
totally unguarded.”59  Every state permitted suits for libel arising 
 
(Douglas, J., concurring)  (prior restraint); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (defamation), abrogated by Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; 
Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 961 (1970) (mem) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting denial of certiorari) (film censorship); Ginzburg v. Goldwater, 396 
U.S. 1049, 1050–51 (1970) (mem) (Black, J., dissenting denial of certiorari) 
(libel); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (threat 
against the life of the President of the United States); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 
116, 136 (1966) (exclusion of representative from membership in the House of 
Representatives); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 
U.S. 53, 62 (1966) (defamation); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) 
(libel); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of  the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) 
(postal censorship); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (libel).  
 52.  See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMEIL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL 
CHAMPION 224 (2010). 
 53.  Schenck v. Unites States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 54.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623–24 (1919). 
 55.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665–71 (1925). 
 56.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).  
 57.  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951). 
 58.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), 
in WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 82 (1976).  In the First Congress, a separate amendment 
forbidding states from violating freedom of the press passed the House, but 
was rejected by the Senate.  See JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS 
FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM 70 (1990). 
 59.  NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
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from debate of public issues; some may have restricted such suits 
more than others,60 but no state held that public debate should be 
uninhibited by defamation law. 
Nevertheless, the ideal of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open 
debate” was a powerful one, and it did not seem to be limited to 
the defamation context.  Such a national commitment should be 
protected from other restraints as well.  And indeed, the promise 
may have been better fulfilled in fields other than defamation.  In 
New York Times Co. v. United States, the “Pentagon Papers” case, 
the Court made clear that public discussion of national security 
matters could not be inhibited, at least by a prior restraint. 61  
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart seemed to allow suppression of 
public discussion about pending trials, but the standards it laid 
down for restraining such speech were so demanding that 
virtually no gag order can meet them.62  The Court held that a 
state could not punish a newspaper for attempting to influence an 
election with a last-minute editorial,63 or breaching the 
confidentiality of a judicial discipline proceeding,64 or violating a 
statute that forbids publication of the name of a juvenile 
offender.65  A newspaper could not be required to publish the reply 
of a public official it attacked.66  A publisher could not be required 
to escrow profits from a criminal’s tell-all book for the benefit of 
his victims.67  States could not differentially tax newspapers, even 
for the purpose of benefitting some of them.68  Nor has the idea of 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate been confined to cases 
involving the press.  It has been invoked to protect labor 
picketing,69 door-to-door canvassing of voters,70 public employees’ 
 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 11 (1986).   
 60.  Compare Coleman v. McLennon, 98 P. 281, 288 (Kan. 1908), with 
Post Publ’g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539 (6th Cir. 1893). 
 61.  403 U.S. 713, 723–24 (1971) (per curiam). 
 62.  427 U.S. 539, 562–70 (1976). 
 63.  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966). 
 64.  Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). 
 65.  Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979). 
 66.  Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255–56, 258 
(1974). 
 67.  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
 68.  Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 585 (1983). 
 69.  Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96, 99 (1972). 
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political rights,71 a candidate’s right to appear on the ballot,72 and 
anti-gay demonstrators at military funerals,73 among many 
others. 
Of course, speech did not turn out to be entirely “uninhibited, 
robust and wide-open” after New York Times.  Even in cases that 
quote that slogan, the Court has permitted speech to be inhibited 
in the interest of a wide variety of other goals, including public 
decency,74 protecting intellectual property,75 protecting access to 
abortion clinics,76 enforcing non-discrimination policies,77 and 
protecting a public official’s authority to run his office.78  As 
Robert O’Neil said, “[d]espite the strong rhetoric about how public 
discourse needed to be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide open,’ when 
the dust settled, there were still situations in which free speech 
and press could be subordinated to individual interests in 
economic ventures, standing in the community, or general good 
feelings.”79 
Kalven thought the decision rejected the judicial 
methodologies that had enabled the Court to subordinate speech 
to other interests.80  He said it did away with the clear and 
present danger test, cut “the balancing test  . . . down to its 
appropriate size,” and rejected the two-level theory in which some 
categories of speech are beneath First Amendment concerns.81  
But the clear and present danger test survives,82 although it is 
applied more rigorously today.  The balancing test, far from being 
cut down to size, seems to have expanded to become the Court’s 
 
 70.  Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). 
 71.  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976). 
 72.  Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794–95 (1983). 
 73.  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215, 1220 (2011). 
 74.  Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976). 
 75.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 
(1985). 
 76.  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000). 
 77.  Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 
(2010). 
 78.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). 
 79.  ROBERT O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 31 (2001) 
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (second 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80.  See Kalven, supra note 42, at 204–05. 
 81.  Id. at 204–05, 216. 
 82.  See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1068–69 (1991); 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).  
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First Amendment methodology of choice.83  Categorization of 
speech as unprotected has diminished though not disappeared;84 
it has been replaced by a two-tier system in which some categories 
of speech are protected but less fully than others.85  So New York 
Times did not launch a methodological revolution. 
It does seem clear, though, that New York Times marked an 
important change in the Court’s view of the importance of free 
speech.  While other interests can still defeat it, free speech enjoys 
a much stronger advantage than it had before New York Times.  
Competing interests are judged more skeptically.  For example, 
while the Court recognizes strong interests in protecting privacy, 
it probes individual privacy claims and rejects those in which it 
finds weaknesses.86  When restrictions on speech are imposed to 
protect defendants’ fair trial rights,87 rehabilitation of juvenile 
offenders,88 or integrity of elections, the Court insists on strong 
proof of necessity.89  Except in the area of national security, there 
is little deference to the legislature’s or the executive’s assessment 
of the need to restrict speech.  The dangers in many of these cases 
would have been sufficiently clear and present to justify 
suppression of speech if that were the test, but since New York 
Times the bar has been raised. 
Some people hoped for a more modest theoretical 
breakthrough: harmonizing libel law with the rest of First 
 
 83.  See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979). 
 84.  See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22–24 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam). 
 85.  See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression. The protection value for particular commercial expression turns 
on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served 
by its regulation.” (citations omitted)). 
 86.  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–35 (2001); Fla. Star, 
491 U.S. at 540–41; Smith, 443 U.S. at 97, 105–06; Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837–38 (1978); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 494–95 (1975).  
 87.  See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054–55. 
 88.  See Smith, 443 U.S. at 104. 
 89.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010); Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1966). 
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Amendment theory.90  Herbert Wechsler, counsel for the New 
York Times, had this goal in mind.  His brief reviewed the Court’s 
decisions on anti-government advocacy,91 provocation,92 freedom 
of association,93 contempt,94 loyalty oaths,95 newspaper 
antitrust,96 and street preaching,97 and claimed that these cases 
“are the premises today of any exploration of the scope of First 
Amendment freedom.”98  Justice Brennan’s opinion cited many of 
the same cases in support of the proposition that “freedom of 
expression upon public questions is secured by the First 
Amendment.”99  But by choosing a solution peculiar to libel law, 
the decision assured that defamation would continue to have its 
own trajectory quite different from the rest of First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  As Robert O’Neil has observed, “libel remains, as it 
has always been, a unique area of First Amendment law.”100 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan failed to fully integrate libel 
with the rest of First Amendment thought, but it did elevate 
speech generally in the pantheon of American values. 
III. SETTING PRIORITIES 
Kalven saw in the decision “a happy revolution of free-speech 
doctrine.”101  He believed that in repudiating seditious libel, the 
Court had identified the central meaning of the First Amendment: 
“a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot 
 
 90.  See generally, e.g., Kalven, supra note 42; Samuel R. Pierce Jr., The 
Anatomy of a Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. 
REV. 315 (1965). 
 91.  Brief for the Petitioner at 42, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964) (Nos. 39, 40), 1963 WL 105891 [hereinafter N.Y. Times Brief] 
(citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931)). 
 92.  Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 93.  Id. at 42–43 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963)). 
 94.  Id. at 44 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1941)). 
 95.  Id. at 43 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 516–17, 520 
(1958)). 
 96.  Id.  at 58 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 
(1945)). 
 97.  Id. at 42–43 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310–11 
(1940)). 
 98.  Id. at 44.   
 99.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).  
 100.  O’NEIL, supra note 79, at 35. 
 101.  Kalven, supra note 42, at 205.  
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function.”102  To him, this meant that “analysis of free-speech 
issues should hereafter begin with the significant issue of 
seditious libel and defamation of government by its critics rather 
than with the sterile example of a man falsely yelling fire in a 
crowded theater.”103  Kalven added: “I am not so much predicting 
what the Court will do with the case as a precedent as I am 
suggesting that the opinion makes a notable shift in constitutional 
idiom and could provide a new start for consideration of free-
speech problems.”104 
His caution was well advised; the decision did not 
revolutionize free speech doctrine.  If he meant only that the 
decision would increase protection for speech about public 
officials, it has indeed done so. However, that was hardly a 
revolution.  The Court had already taken giant steps in that 
direction in the contempt cases.105  Although those cases had left 
open the possibility that criticism of judges and courts might be 
punished as contempt on a showing of clear and present danger, it 
was already clear that such punishments would rarely be 
permitted.106  That did not mean that public officials could be 
defamed with impunity, of course; but if non-defamatory calumny 
of judges was protected, it was not unthinkable that they and 
other public officials might have to endure some defamation too. 
But the broader revolution that Kalven envisioned was 
toward the view of the First Amendment espoused by Alexander 
Meiklejohn, who argued that speech relating to self-government 
was absolutely protected.107  The Court has consistently protected 
such speech, but by rationales that fall far short of Meiklejohn’s 
absolutist view.108  Nor has the Court ever accepted Meiklejohn’s 
 
 102.  Id. at 208. 
 103.  Id. at 205. 
 104.  Id. at 194. 
 105.  See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 
331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1941).  
 106.  See, e.g., Wood, 370 U.S. at 383 (“[T]he burden upon this Court is to 
define the limitations upon the contempt power according to the terms of the 
Federal Constitution.”). 
 107.  See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 252, 255 (1961). 
 108.  See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 
(1978) (reversing a criminal conviction for disclosing information about 
judicial disciplinary proceedings because the interests advanced by the state 
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corollary, which was that “[t]he First Amendment does not protect 
a ‘freedom to speak.’  It protects the freedom of those activities of 
thought and communication by which we ‘govern.’  It is concerned 
not with a private right, but rather with a public power, a 
governmental responsibility.”109 
If the revolution that Kalven foresaw was that the Court 
henceforth would concentrate its fire on what he and Meiklejohn 
saw as “the central meaning” and not waste bullets on the 
periphery, that has not happened.  The Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence since New York Times has moved far afield from 
speech relevant to self-government.  The Court has fired bullets in 
defense of crush videos,110 video games,111 commercial speech,112 
pornography,113 indecency on cable television,114 and hate 
speech115 – subjects that would seem to have more to do with 
private rights than governing. 
Meiklejohn said “[w]e must recognize that there are many 
forms of communication which, since they are not being used as 
activities of governing, are wholly outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.”116  But his view was perplexingly complicated.  He 
thought, “literature and the arts are protected because they have 
a ‘social importance’ which I have called a ‘governing’ 
importance.”117  So perhaps some of the Court’s forays that seem 
to have more to do with private rights qualify as governance-
related because “[t]hey lead the way toward sensitive and 
informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the 
riches of the general welfare are created.”118 
 
were “insufficient”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725–26 
(1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers 
because the government had not met a heavy burden of showing 
justification). 
 109.  Meiklejohn, supra note 107, at 255. Perhaps Kalven didn’t endorse 
the negative corollary, but his enthusiasm for Meiklejohn’s theory did not 
appear to be qualified.  See generally Kalven, supra note 42. 
 110.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 111.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 112.  E.g., 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 113.  E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 114.  E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 115.  E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 116.  Meiklejohn, supra note 107, at 258. 
 117.  Id. at 262. 
 118.  Id. at 257. 
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If the central meaning is that expansive, it has little utility; in 
that view, the central meaning is that all speech that has social 
value is equally protected.  But I do not believe that is the idea 
that Kalven embraced.  He applauded the New York Times 
decision because he believed that it marked the beginning of a 
new theory of the First Amendment, one that emphasized the 
protection of speech that was important for self-government – not 
self-fulfillment or self-expression.119  If I am right, New York 
Times brought about no revolution; the Court has given speech 
about self-government no greater primacy than it had before.  
Indeed, such speech now receives far less of the Court’s attention 
than speech that primarily concerns self-expression or personal 
enjoyment.120  The Court has avoided cases involving speech 
about great public issues – the reasons for and conduct of war,121 
the suppression of speech to combat terrorism,122 massive 
surveillance of citizens’ communications,123 and the leaking of 
information held secret in the name of national security,124 while 
extending First Amendment protection to video games in which 
the player engages in virtual rape, torture, and 
dismemberment,125 lying about military honors,126 and 
pharmaceutical advertising that creates false epidemics of 
impotence and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.127 
IV. PROTECTING INFORMATION, NOT JUST IDEAS 
Another potential consequence of New York Times, less 
remarked then and since, might have been to establish a 
 
 119.  See Kalven, supra note 42, at 255. 
 120.  Of course, that might be because protection of speech relating to self-
government is well settled while the status of other types of speech is more 
uncertain. 
 121.  E.g., Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). 
 122.  E.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004) (mem).  
 123.  E.g., Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1179 (2008) (mem).   
 124.  E.g, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (mem). 
 125.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 126.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 127.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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meaningful public right to be informed.  Until New York Times, 
First Amendment jurisprudence, at least in the Supreme Court, 
focused primarily on the expression of ideas.  In the great 
formative cases of the 20th century, First Amendment claimants 
were defending their right to express opinions.  Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs ran afoul of the law by exhorting people to 
resist the draft.128  Abrams’s crime was verbally attacking 
capitalism;129 Gitlow’s was advocating overthrow of the 
government;130 Whitney’s and Dennis’ was embracing the 
Communist Party;131 Cantwell’s was expressing a low opinion of 
the Catholic Church;132 and Chaplinsky’s was insulting a police 
officer.133  None of these defendants were prosecuted for conveying 
information.  Even the contempt cases134 were primarily about 
opinions – unwelcome opinions about actions of judges. 
New York Times took a giant step beyond those cases by 
protecting statements of fact, even false ones.  The opinion 
approvingly quoted Judge Edgerton’s assertion that “[t]he 
protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but 
information.”135  The Court’s key conclusion – that some 
falsehoods must be protected to prevent self-censorship136 – can 
only pertain to information because ideas or opinions cannot be 
false.  The Court embraced Madison’s view that freedom of speech 
and press are necessary prerequisites for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty.137  “The right of free public discussion of the 
stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a 
fundamental principle of the American form of government.”138  
 
 128.  Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212, 216 (1919); Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205–06 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919). 
 129.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617, 619–20 (1919). 
 130.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 655–56 (1925). 
 131.  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 363–68 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 132.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1940). 
 133.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569–70 (1942). 
 134.  See supra note 105. 
 135.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting 
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). 
 136.  Id. at 279. 
 137.  See id. at 275–76. 
 138.  Id. at 275. 
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That discussion would be woefully incomplete if it consisted only 
of ideas and opinions without factual information. 
The Court did not consistently distinguish between fact and 
opinions or ideas.  Indeed, the opinion obscures the advance by 
speaking as if the case involved only the protection of ideas.  It 
cites the earlier First Amendment cases as authority without 
acknowledging that there might be a difference between 
protecting ideas and protecting statements of fact.139  It quotes 
statements about “unfettered interchange of ideas”140 and 
“enlightened opinion.”141  It repeats the assertion from Cantwell v. 
Connecticut that compares political belief to religious faith and 
declares that excesses must be expected in both.142  It repeatedly 
refers to the need to protect “critics” and “criticism,” as if nothing 
more was at issue in the case.143  But Sullivan was not 
complaining about ideas or opinions; his complaint was that the 
advertisement at issue had gone beyond that, ascribing to him 
specific acts of dishonorable conduct that he did not commit.144  
Protecting that speech required the Court to go beyond anything it 
had done before. 
Of course, there is no bright line between facts and ideas, as 
the Court recognized many years later when asked to recognize 
additional protection for defamation in statements of opinion.145  
Most expressions of opinion state, or at least imply, some factual 
assertions.146  That is true of the advertisement in New York 
Times.  The factual statements were part of an effort to persuade 
readers that the opinions voiced in the advertisement were 
 
 139.  See id. at 269–73. 
 140.  Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 141.  Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 
(1940)). 
 142.  Id. (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310). 
 143.  See id. passim. 
 144.  Id. at 256–58. 
 145.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990). 
 146.  The archaic “rolled-up plea” was a sensible response to this: it 
allowed a defendant to plead that any factual matter in the defamatory 
publication was true and any statements of opinion were fair comment, 
without having to identify which were which.  See, e.g., Shenkman v. 
O’Malley, 2 A.D.2d 567, 569, 572–73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (identifying “the 
‘rolled up plea’ of truth and fair comment” as a complete defense, but holding 
that the plea failed because repeating opinions of others was not fair 
comment). 
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correct: civil rights demonstrators were being treated unjustly and 
their cause deserved readers’ financial support.147  So it was not 
implausible to speak in New York Times of protecting ideas, even 
though more was involved.  It was only in later cases that it 
became clear that the decision protected information even when it 
was not part of any exposition of ideas or opinions.148 
The breakthrough in New York Times was the recognition 
that democracy requires not just freedom to speak one’s mind, but 
also freedom to be informed about public issues.149  Perhaps 
because that idea was only implied and not expressed, it has been 
generally ignored.  Although the Court later flirted with the idea 
of a right to receive information,150 that right has been all but 
stillborn.  Had the implication been clearly seen and embraced, it 
might have done much to give meaning to Madison’s dictum that 
“[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty.”151  As it is, the government has great freedom to 
manipulate the public’s exercise of sovereignty by managing, 
controlling, and hiding information. 
If the Court had followed the logic of the public’s right to be 
informed, the right could have partially filled the gap left by the 
Court’s continuing refusal to give force to the press clause.152  The 
press clause was included in the First Amendment to protect 
discussion of public affairs, which the Framers believed was an 
essential prerequisite for self-government.153  The Court has 
partially achieved that objective through the speech clause, 
protecting in the name of “freedom of speech” matters that the 
 
 147.  See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 257–58. 
 148.  See, e.g., Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300–01 (1971) 
(applying New York Times to a news report that erroneously identified 
plaintiff as a criminal suspect). 
 149.  See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 150.  See generally, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 478 (1976) (invalidating restriction on drug 
advertising, not as an abridgement of speaker’s First Amendment rights, but 
as a violation of a consumer’s right to receive information). 
 151.  N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 274 (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 
(Jonathan Elliot ed.,1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152.  See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829–31 (1974). 
 153.  I discussed this history at length in The Origins of the Press Clause, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). 
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Framers would have thought of as freedom of the press issues.154  
Indeed, New York Times itself is a case that the Framers would 
have seen as a free press case.  That is true not only of the case 
against the Times, a press entity, but also the case of the four 
individual defendants; their use of someone else’s printing press to 
express their views is exactly how the Framers envisioned the free 
press operating.155  Counsel for the Times treated the case 
consistently as a free press case; he never invoked freedom of 
speech.156  The brief of the four individual defendants hedged: it 
spoke of “freedom of utterance,”157 “freedom of written 
expression,”158 “freedoms of press, speech, assembly and 
association,”159 or simply “the Constitution.”160  But the Court 
treated New York Times and subsequent cases as free speech 
cases, and when free press claims could not be squeezed into the 
free speech category,161 the Court’s response has been to deny a 
remedy as it has done in cases denying access to government 
information.162  Recognizing that New York Times implied a 
public right to the information necessary for self-governance 
would have compelled a different result in those cases, or at least 
a less facile one. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s reform of libel law has to be judged a success, not 
because the actual malice test was a success, but because of the 
 
 154.  See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991); Neb. Press Ass’n 
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
 155.  See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 429, 
446–47 (2002) (“‘Freedom of the Press’ referred to the freedom of the people to 
publish their views, rather than the freedom of journalists to pursue their 
craft.”). 
 156.  See generally N.Y. Times Brief, supra note 91. 
 157.  Brief for the Petitioners at 18, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964) (Nos. 39, 40), 1963 WL 105893.  This was the brief of the four 
individual petitioners, whose case was briefed and argued separately from 
that of the Times.  
 158.  Id. at 39.  
 159.  Id. at 26. 
 160.  Id. at 62. 
 161.  As was done in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980).  
 162.  See, e.g., Houchin v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1978); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829–34 (1974). 
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Court’s persistence in refining, expanding, and enforcing New 
York Times.  The recognition that libel law could violate the First 
Amendment was the critical step that made possible all the 
Court’s subsequent defamation decisions and the many 
restrictions later imposed on libel law by state judges and 
legislatures. 
The decision altered First Amendment theory, not as 
dramatically as its admirers had hoped, but implicitly, by 
elevating free speech to a position of primacy that it had not 
previously enjoyed.  It did not revolutionize First Amendment 
theory, but its impact has been felt in many areas other than 
defamation.  It did not succeed in focusing the Court’s attention on 
a “central meaning” of the First Amendment; on the contrary, 
First Amendment jurisprudence has only grown more scattershot, 
if not incoherent. 
By extending First Amendment protection to information as 
well as ideas, the decision had the potential to limit the 
government’s ability to hinder discussion on public issues by 
manipulating and hiding information.  The Court invoked 
Madison’s assertion that “the censorial power is in the people over 
the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”163  
The decision could have been read to give meaning to that ideal, 
but that interpretation has failed to gain any traction. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan did less than its fans hoped it 
would, but few could have imagined that what began as a garden-
variety torts case would become one of the most transformative 
legal events of the 20th century. 
 
 
 163.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (quoting 4 
ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
